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Firing Threats and Tenure: 
Incentive Effects and Impression Management 
 
Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez, and Stephen Rassenti∗ 
Abstract 
We study the effect of firing threats and tenure in a virtual workplace that reproduces 
features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can 
fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice more than organizations for 
which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure 
activities. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats significantly 
underperformed those using individual incentives. Our analysis also indicates that, in 
the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities 
in order to be seen as hard-working individuals. These results are consistent with the 
predictions of our theoretical model in which workers aim at signaling a high level of 
intrinsic motivation to increase their chance of obtaining tenure. Finally, we show 
that production levels dropped substantially under tenure while on-the-job leisure 
surged.  
KEYWORDS: Firing threats, tenure, incentives, impression management 
JEL CODES: C92, D23, D82. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In settings in which employers are unable to provide individual incentives to workers, the 
threat of being fired becomes an essential feature of an employment contract (Becker and Stigler, 
(1974), Klein and Leffler, (1981), Shapiro and Stiglitz, (1984), MacLeod and Malcomson, 
(1989)). At the empirical level, researchers have assessed the effectiveness of firing threats by 
studying employment protection legislation. For example, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) study 
absenteeism levels of the workers of an Italian bank before and after a probationary period. The 
authors find evidence of an increase in the level of absenteeism after the probationary period 
suggesting a negative incentive effect of employment protection. Similar results were reported 
by Riphahn (2004) regarding the negative effect of employment protection on absenteeism of 
German workers.  
In this paper, we propose a different approach by assessing the impact of firing threats and 
tenure in a laboratory environment in which we control for possible confounding factors such as 
firm size, industry structure, job characteristics, demand shocks, or organizational design. To that 
end, we build on a platform that reproduces several features of real-world work environments 
such as real-effort tasks and real-leisure alternative activities (Internet browsing). We study 
organizations in which bosses are endowed with a real-time monitoring technology so as to 
assess the work of their nine employees in each of the five periods of the experiment. At the 
same time, we gave organizational members access to an electronic chat room to exchange 
messages during the experiment.   
We consider three types of incentive structures. In all cases subjects received the same fixed 
wage at the beginning of each period regardless of pending work productivity. Under the fixed 
wage only treatment employees received no further incentives, while under firing threats they 
could be fired for poor productivity. Under individual incentives employees could not be fired 
but each of them was also rewarded the entire income generated by his or her individual 
production on the work task. 
In the fixed wage and firing threats treatments the boss kept all income generated by the output 
produced by all the members of the organization. Under firing threats, the boss was also given 
the option to dismiss one employee at the end of each of periods 2, 3, and 4.1 Bosses saved on 
                                            
1 Workers could not be re-hired by the boss in the rest of the experiment.  
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labor costs after firing employees as they would not have to continue to pay their fixed wages. 
Any subject who made it to the start of the last period without being fired found him/herself with 
de facto tenure for that final production period.  
Our analysis relates to the seminal work of Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) which studies a 
repeated principal-agent model à la Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) in which there is an 
excess supply of agents. In this setting, principals and agents can sign one-period contracts which 
specify a fixed payment from the principal to the agent and a desired but non-enforceable level 
of transfer from the agent to the principal. A crucial difference with the original setting of Fehr et 
al. (1993) is that the authors allow for reputational concerns and long-term contracts by keeping 
subjects’ identification numbers constant across periods. The authors find that principals and 
agents were willing to develop long-term relationships which in turn resulted in high levels of 
transfers. The findings in Brown et al. (2004) are in line with the disciplining version of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis according to which a combination of high wages and threat of 
dismissal leads to high levels of effort. 
In a recent experimental study, Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2011) extend the work of Brown 
et al. (2004) by introducing barriers to dismissals. The authors show that dismissal barriers tend 
to deter principals from building long-term relationships with agents. This is the case because 
agents’ transfers are significantly reduced when the threat of being dismissed by the principal is 
eliminated. Note that in Brown et al. (2004) and in Falk et al. (2011) dismissals occur either 
because the principal signs a one-period contract with another agent or because the agent quits. 
Even though this contractual design constitutes a privileged setting for studying relational 
contracts and dismissal barriers, it cannot isolate the effect of firing threats from the effect of 
quitting. In the present study, we abstract away from career concerns and labor markets and 
focus on the impact of firing threats and tenure on organizational behavior. To that end, we study 
firing threats and tenure within a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing 
organizations such as real effort tasks, real-time monitoring, on-the-job leisure (Internet 
browsing) and chatting (Corgnet, Hernan-Gonzalez and Rassenti, 2013).2 
We found that organizations in which bosses were allowed to fire their employees produced 
more than twice as much as organizations which only relied on the payment of fixed wages. This 
                                            
2 This experimental platform was built in line with previous research introducing real-effort experiments in the study 
of labor issues (e.g. Dickinson, 1999, Van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001)). 
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was the case even though by the end of the experiment organizations which fired employees 
were about 30% smaller than those that couldn’t. Firing threats also decreased Internet usage and 
chatting activities by 71.6%. Remarkably, firing threats reduced leisure activities and increased 
production levels for both low- and high- ability workers. This finding stresses that firing threats 
stimulated all workers in the organization despite the fact that bosses could only fire up to one 
third of their workforce. In our theoretical framework, we account for this possibility by 
introducing intrinsic motivation in the analysis of firing threats. We demonstrate that managers 
have incentives to fire high-ability subjects that show no intrinsic motivation in completing the 
task. This is the case because workers who are not intrinsically motivated will reduce their 
production levels once they are granted tenure. By contrast, intrinsically motivated workers, 
regardless of ability levels, will maintain their level of effort in the tenure period despite the lack 
of monetary incentives. 
Nevertheless, the incentive effects of firing threats were not as compelling as those of 
individual incentives. More specifically, we showed that organizations endowed with individual 
incentives outperformed those endowed with firing threats by 32.6%. Interestingly, leisure 
activities were as low in the presence of firing threats as they were under individual incentives. 
Workers spent 7.5% of their time browsing the Internet in organizations endowed with firing 
threats compared with 8.7% in organizations relying on individual incentives. As a result, the 
difference in workers’ production levels between the two treatments was due to a discrepancy in 
productivity levels rather than to a difference in working time. Indeed, productivity levels in the 
presence of firing threats were 26.5% lower than under individual incentives.  
These findings suggest that in the presence of firing threats, employees were willing to signal 
themselves as hard-working individuals who spend long hours at their workstation without 
browsing the Internet. Social psychologists refer to this process by which people attempt to 
influence others’ perceptions of themselves as impression management.3 We account for 
impression management in our theoretical framework by showing that non-intrinsically 
motivated workers with high levels of ability may be willing to signal themselves as low-ability 
intrinsically motivated workers. In that case, high-ability workers who are inherently more 
productive than low-ability workers would have spare time available for non-productive 
                                            
3 According to Newman (2009, p. 184), impression management is an “act presenting a favorable public image of 
oneself so that others will form positive judgments”. 
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activities. During this time, the high-ability workers will avoid browsing the Internet. Instead, 
they will stay at their workstation without producing to mimic the work behavior of intrinsically 
motivated low-ability workers. 
In line with concerns for impression management, we report that employees were reluctant to 
include their boss in their communications to other employees. Under firing threats a majority of 
employees deliberately excluded their boss from the list of recipients of their messages (54.8%) 
while only a very small proportion of employees did so in the absence of firing threats (6.9%).4 
When firing threats disappear during the last production period of the firing threats treatment, 
workers’ production collapsed to levels which were similar to those of organizations which 
solely relied on the payment of fixed wages. In this last period, average production was twice 
larger under individual incentives than in the treatment with firing threats. Consistently, Internet 
usage surged in the last period of the treatment with firing threats while it did not increase in the 
last period of the other two treatments. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1. Virtual Organizations 
We develop a framework in which subjects can undertake a real-effort organizational task 
while having access to Internet browsing and chatting activities at any point in time during the 
experiment. We consider organizations with ten subjects, nine of which were referred to as B 
subjects while the remaining subject was referred to as the C subject. C subjects could monitor B 
subjects’ activities in real time. A session consisted of 5 periods of 20 minutes each.5 The 
experimental environment is described in detail below.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
4 Most of these messages were classified as general chat, not related with any strategic behavior of the participants. 
5 Due to a technical issue with the software, one of the sessions in Treatment W lasted only for 4 periods. This 
problem was solved for the other sessions. We control for this effect in the analysis of the results. 
6 See instructions at http://sites.google.com/site/vofiring/instructions. A video presentation of the software is 
available at http://sites.google.com/site/virtualorganization/videos. 
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2.1.1. Tasks 
The Work Task 
We introduced a particularly long and laborious task so as to ensure that completing the work 
task required a significant level of effort. Subjects were asked to sum up matrices of 36 numbers 
for 1 hour and 40 minutes.7 As a result, we expected to identify signs of fatigue and boredom 
during the experiment. In the work task, participants were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper 
or calculator. This rule amplified the level of effort subjects had to exert in order to complete 
tables correctly. Each table had 6 rows and 6 columns. The numbers in each table were generated 
randomly. An example is shown in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1.—Example of table summation for the work task. 
Before providing the final sum of all numbers in the table, participants had to fill in the 12 cells 
that could be used to sum each row and each column separately. Filling in these cells did not 
directly generate earnings but could help subjects compute the final sum: only the final answer 
was rewarded. Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20 
cents was subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer.8 After each subject 
completed a table, the accumulated individual production was updated so that subjects knew 
whether their answer was correct or not. At the end of each period, and only then, the total 
amount of money generated by all 10 participants during the period was displayed in the history 
panel located at the bottom of the subjects’ screens. 
                                            
7 Different variations of this task have been used by Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk (2009), Dohmen and Falk 
(2010), and Abeler, Falk, Goette and Huffman (2011). A counting task that consisted of summing up the number of 
zeros in a table randomly filled with ones and zeros was also used in Falk and Huffman (2007). A long typing task 
was used in Dickinson’s (1999) experiment for which subjects had to come during four days for a two-hour 
experiment. Falk and Ichino (2006) used a four-hour mailing task in their field experiment on peer effects. In 
another field experiment by Gneezy and List (2006), subjects were asked to enter data into a computer database for 
six hours. 
8 Penalties did not apply when individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be 
negative. 
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At any point during the experiment, all participants could switch from the work task to Internet 
browsing or chatting. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a different window and the 
experimenter had a precise measurement of the aggregate time spent undertaking each activity. 
The Low Effort Clicking Task 
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click on a box moving 
slowly from left to right at the bottom of their screen. This clicking task aimed at representing 
the pay that workers obtain just for being present at their workstation regardless of their 
commitment to the work task. The introduction of the clicking task allowed subjects to collect a 
constant flow of earnings with low effort but without actually working dilligently at the high 
effort work task. Each time subjects clicked on a box they earned 5 cents. The box appeared at 
the bottom of a subject’s screen every 25 seconds whether the subject was currently working on 
the work task, chatting, or browsing the Internet. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 
periods of 20 minutes each, subjects could earn a total of $12.00 just by clicking on all the 240 
boxes that appeared on the screen during the experiment.  
2.1.2. Internet Browsing 
Internet browsing and the work task were undertaken on different windows so that subjects 
could not complete tables while browsing the Internet. Switching back and forth between the 
Internet browser and other activities was quick and easy. Subjects who returned to the Internet 
screen after being involved in another activity were automatically directed to the last web page 
they visited. Subjects were free to consult their email or visit any web page.9 The Internet 
browser was embedded in the software (see Figure 2) so that the experimenter could keep a 
record of the switching times between activities as well as the exact amount of time subjects 
spent on each activity. Participants were informed that their usage of the Internet was strictly 
confidential. 
                                            
9 Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet on campus. 
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FIGURE 2.—Embedded Internet screen. 
The introduction of Internet is motivated by the widespread use of Internet at the workplace. 
According to a 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com, employees spend about 26% of 
their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski (2005)). Almost half of this time 
actually corresponds to Internet usage. In addition, a study by Nielsen/Net Ratings report that 
people spend more than twice as much time online at the office as they do at home (Farrell 
(2000)). Gordon (2000) argues that Internet usage in the workplace may damage employees’ 
productivity (see also Young (2005, 2006)).  
An appealing feature of Internet as an alternative to the work task is the wide range of activities 
that can be completed online. Indeed, a large number of people are likely to derive utility from 
Internet access as they will be able to browse Web pages that best fit their personal interests. 
Two related studies (Charness, Masclet and Villeval (2010), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval 
(2009)) have also introduced on-the-job leisure activities in experimental environments by giving 
subjects access to magazines. 
2.1.3. Chatting Activities 
Subjects also had access to a chat room through which they could communicate with the other 
subjects during the experiment. A subject could send a message to all subjects at once or to any 
subset of them. One could access the chat room by simply clicking on the Chat option in the 
activity drop-down menu at the bottom-right of their screens. If a subject received a message 
while not currently in the chat room, a pop-up window displaying the content of the message as 
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well as the experiment ID of the sender would automatically appear on his or her screen. As a 
result, incoming chat could potentially distract subjects completing the work task. 
2.1.4. Monitoring Activities 
In all treatments, the C subject (boss) could monitor the nine B subjects’ (employees’) 
activities at any time during the experiment by selecting the Watch option in the drop-down 
menu. Monitoring activities had to be undertaken in a separate window so that the boss could not 
complete his or her own work task, chat or browse the Internet while monitoring his or her 
employees. In the monitoring screen, a C subject could decide whether to monitor only a subset 
or all the B subjects at the same time. The information was displayed in a table, where each 
column showed information regarding the activities completed by a given subject (see Figure 3). 
 
FIGURE 3.—Monitoring screen with a zoom on subject B13. 
The header of each column indicated the subject’s experiment ID. Each cell of a given column 
displayed information in real time about the activities undertaken by the selected subject. These 
activities were labeled as follows: Watch (monitoring B subjects’ activities), Internet (browsing 
the web), Task (completing the work task), or Chat (chatting with other participants). Monitors 
were also informed whenever a subject entered the sum of a column or a row before providing a 
final answer for the work task. This was described as Sum Column in the monitoring table. 
Finally, the current total production of monitored subjects, as well as their contribution to the 
work task (in % terms), were shown in the monitoring screen.  
B subjects were notified with a message stating “The C subject is watching you” jointly with an 
eye picture whenever they were being watched. At the end of each period, the C subject had 
access to a monitoring summary, including information regarding B subjects’ production levels 
and contributions to total production. 
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2.2. Treatments 
We conducted three different treatments (see Table 1). In Treatments W (only fixed wage) and 
F (firing threats), B subjects were rewarded a fixed payment of 200¢ each period while not 
receiving incentives based on their performance on the work task. The C subject received the 
output produced by all subjects (including him/herself) on the work task while not being paid any 
fixed wage. In the firing threats treatment, the C subject could fire one B subject at the end of 
each of the periods 2, 3 and 4. The C subject did not need to pay the fixed wage to dismissed B 
subjects in the subsequent periods.  
 
Dismissed B subjects could only browse the Internet, and they were rewarded solely for their 
earnings on the clicking task which were reduced to 1¢ per box instead of 5¢ per box for the 
                                            
10 One session was cancelled because of insufficient subjects.  
TABLE 1. Summary of the treatments. 
Treatment Description Number of sessions (subjects) 
 
Fixed wage only (W) 
 
B subjects were paid a fixed wage of 200¢ 
per period. The C subject kept the value of 
all output produced by all B subjects in the 
organization. In addition the C subject was 
paid the value of his/her own production.  
The C subject could monitor B subjects’ 
activities but had no possible recourse. 
5 (50)10 
 
Firing threats (F) 
Payment exactly as in (W). The C subject 
could monitor B subjects’ activities, and 
could fire a B subject at the end of periods 
2, 3 and 4.  
6 (60) 
 
Individual incentives (I) 
B subjects were paid a fixed wage of 200¢ 
per period and were also rewarded the full 
value of all output they produced. The C 
subject was paid only the value of his/her 
own production. The C subject could 
monitor  B subjects’ activities but had no 
possible recourse.  
6 (60) 
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active B and C subjects.11 They were not able to chat with active B and C subjects, and they 
could not be rehired. 
In the individual incentives treatment, B subjects received a fixed payment of 200¢ per period 
as in the previous treatments, in addition to being rewarded on the work task according to their 
individual production. 
In all treatments, subjects received their individual earnings on the clicking task. 
 
2.3. Procedures 
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major US University. The experiments took 
place in May 2011. In total, 170 subjects participated in the experiment, divided into 17 sessions. 
We conducted five sessions for Treatment W, and six sessions for each of Treatments F and I. 
Ten students participated in each session. All of the interaction was anonymous. 
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screens. Subjects had exactly 20 
minutes to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was shown on the laboratory screen. Three 
minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor announced the time remaining and 
handed out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the participants asked for 
extra time to read the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the instructions 
file was closed, and subjects typed their names to start the experiment. The interaction between 
the experimenter and the participants was negligible. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were computed as the sum of all 
earnings in the 5 periods. Participants playing the role of a B (C) subject in Treatments W, F, and 
I, earned on average $28.00 ($55.25), $27.74 ($85.20), and $38.95 ($37.91), respectively. This 
includes a $7.00 show-up fee. Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours and thirty 
minutes.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
11 As a result, the maximum period earnings of dismissed subjects on the clicking task were equal to 48¢ instead of 
240¢ for B and C subjects. 
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3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  
FIRING THREATS AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT 
In order to establish predictions regarding production levels and Internet usage across 
treatments, we rely on standard incentive theory (see Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).  
We build on a two-period model of an organization composed of n workers and a supervisor.12 
Workers 
In each period, worker 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 = {1, … ,𝑛} dedicates his or her time to attend either work 
(𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0) or leisure activities (𝑙𝑖 ≥ 0) where 𝑒𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖 = 𝜑 and 𝜑 > 0 is the total amount of time 
available to workers. We allow for workers who are present at their workstation to dedicate their 
time either to productive (𝑒𝑖𝑃 ≥ 0) or nonproductive activities (𝑒𝑖~𝑃 ≥ 0) where 𝑒𝑖 = 𝑒𝑖𝑃 + 𝑒𝑖~𝑃. 
Only productive effort generates production on the work task (𝑞𝑖). However, workers may still 
decide to attend their workstation without generating production (𝑒𝑖~𝑃 > 0) so as to give their 
supervisor the impression that they prefer the work task to Internet browsing. In that case, the 
worker may either decide to complete the task with minimal effort (e.g. providing random 
answers) or choose not to complete the task at all. We refer to this behavior as impression 
management. 
Definition. Worker i is involved in impression management whenever 𝑒𝑖~𝑃 > 0. 
We assume that each worker i possesses a level of ability on the work task denoted by 𝛼𝑖 ∈{𝛼𝐿 ,𝛼𝐻}, with 𝛼𝐿 <  𝛼𝐻, which determines the marginal product of the productive effort as 
𝑞𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑃. We assume that ability levels are workers’ private information. We denote by 𝑁𝑗 ⊂ 𝑁 
the set of workers endowed with ability 𝛼𝑗, with 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻}. We denote by 𝑛𝑗 > 0 the number of 
workers endowed with ability 𝛼𝑗 so that the total number of workers is defined as 𝑛 = 𝑛𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻.  
We consider that the cost of productive effort 𝐶(𝑒𝑖𝑃) for worker i is such that 𝐶′(∙) > 0 and 
𝐶′′(∙) > 0. We assume that the nonproductive effort entails no costs save the opportunity costs 
of not producing for cash or enjoying the leisure activity. Also, we denote by 𝑣(𝑙𝑖) the utility that 
worker i derived from the leisure activity, where 𝑣′(∙) > 0 and 𝑣′′(∙) < 0. In order to keep the 
focus of our analysis on workers’ heterogeneity in abilities, we consider that workers have the 
                                            
12 This model does not include multiple probationary periods as is the case in our experimental design. The essence 
of our results would not be affected by considering such case.   
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same cost of effort and the same utility of leisure. We denote by ꙍ the fixed wage received by 
each worker at the beginning of a period. 
Importantly, we consider that regardless of their ability level workers can either be intrinsically 
motivated to complete the work task or not.13 We assume that a worker’s intrinsic motivation is 
private information. We denote by 𝑛𝑗,𝑅 (𝑛𝑗,~𝑅) the number of (not) intrinsically motivated 
workers of ability 𝛼𝑗, with 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿,𝐻}. Intrinsically motivated workers derive direct utility from 
working (Deci (1971), Deci (1975) and Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999)). We denote such utility 
as 𝜗(𝑒𝑖𝑃), with 𝜗(𝑒𝑖𝑃) ≔ 0 for non-intrinsically motivated workers, and with 𝜗(𝑒𝑖𝑃) > 0 for 
𝑒𝑖
𝑃 > 0 (𝜗(0) = 0) and 𝜗′(∙) > 0 and 𝜗′′(∙) < 0 for intrinsically motivated workers.  
Supervisor 
Each organization is monitored by a supervisor 𝑠 ∉ 𝑁. The supervisor can monitor workers 
and obtain information regarding their production levels (𝑞𝑖) and their dedication to the work 
task (𝑒𝑖). However, the supervisor cannot distinguish between productive and nonproductive 
work activities. In addition to monitoring, supervisors can dedicate their time either to work or 
leisure activities so that: 𝑚𝑠 + 𝑒𝑠 + 𝑙𝑠 = 𝜑 where 𝑚𝑠 is the time dedicated to monitoring 
activities.  For simplicity, we consider two levels of monitoring intensity (𝑚s ϵ {0,𝑚�} ).14 For 
𝑚𝑠 =  𝑚� , the supervisor can observe individual production and effort levels while in the absence 
of monitoring (𝑚s =  0), the supervisor can only observe the total production of the 
organization, that is ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 + 𝑞𝑠, where 𝑞𝑠 is the supervisor’s production. The cost of 
monitoring activities is specified as follows: 𝐶𝑚(0) = 0 and 𝐶𝑚(𝑚�) = 𝑐̅ where 𝑐̅ > 0. In all 
treatments, the supervisor’s own effort is rewarded at its marginal product. 
Now we describe subjects’ utility functions for each treatment: 
Individual Incentives Treatment (Treatment I) 
In the individual incentives treatment, workers’ utility function is described as follows:  
𝑈𝑖 ≔� �ꙍ + 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑣�𝑙𝑖(𝑡)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑖𝑃(𝑡)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑖𝑃(𝑡)��2
𝑡=1
 
                                            
13 Note that instead of intrinsic motivation we could have invoked altruism (Rotemberg, 1994) and other social 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) to justify that workers may exert effort in the absence of monetary incentives. 
14 We could consider an intermediate level of monitoring for which the supervisor only observes individual 
production. The nature of our results would not be affected by considering such extension. 
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and supervisor’s utility function is as follows: 
𝑈𝑠 ≔��𝛼𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑣�𝑙𝑠(𝑡)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑠𝑃(𝑡)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑠𝑃(𝑡)� − 𝐶𝑚�𝑚𝑠(𝑡)� − 𝑛ꙍ�2
𝑡=1
 
Fixed Wage Treatment (Treatment W) 
Similarly, in the fixed wage treatment, workers’ utility function is described as follows:  
𝑈𝑖 ≔��ꙍ + 𝑣�𝑙𝑖(𝑡)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑖𝑃(𝑡)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑖𝑃(𝑡)��2
𝑡=1
 
and supervisor’s utility function is as follows: 
𝑈𝑠 ≔��𝛼𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑣�𝑙𝑠(𝑡)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑠𝑃(𝑡)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑠𝑃(𝑡)� − 𝐶𝑚�𝑚𝑠(𝑡)� + �𝑞𝑖(𝑡)
𝑖𝜖𝑁
− 𝑛ꙍ�
2
𝑡=1
 
Firing Treatment (Treatment F) 
In the firing treatment, the first period corresponds to a probationary period at the end of 
which, and after having paid workers’ wages, the supervisor can fire 𝑛𝑓 workers where 
𝑛𝑓𝜖�0,1, … ,𝑛�𝑓� and 𝑛�𝑓 ≤ 𝑛. We denote 𝑁𝐹 the set of fired workers. In the second period, which 
can be seen as a tenure period, the workers who were not fired at the end of the first period will 
receive the same fixed wage ꙍ > 0 as in the first period. Fired workers will not receive any fixed 
wage and will not be able to produce anymore. Workers will not have the opportunity to work in 
another organization in the second period. This cost of being fired can be seen as temporary 
unemployment. 
In that setting, the utility function for worker i can be described as follows:  
𝑈𝑖 ≔ ꙍ + 𝑣�𝑙𝑖(1)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑖𝑃(1)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑖𝑃(1)� +(1 − 𝜋𝑖) �ꙍ + 𝑣�𝑙𝑖(2)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑖𝑃(2)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑖𝑃(2)�� + 𝜋𝑖𝑣�𝑙𝑖(2)� 
where 𝜋𝑖 is the probability for worker i to be fired at the end of the first period. Supervisor’s 
utility function is as follows: 
𝑈𝑠 ≔ ��𝛼𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑃(𝑡) + 𝑣�𝑙𝑠(𝑡)� − 𝐶�𝑒𝑠𝑃(𝑡)� + 𝜗�𝑒𝑠𝑃(𝑡)� − 𝐶𝑚�𝑚𝑠(𝑡)��2
𝑡=1
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+�𝑞𝑗(1)
𝑗𝜖𝑁
− 𝑛ꙍ + � 𝑞𝑗(2)
𝑗𝜖𝑁∖𝑁𝐹
− �𝑛 − 𝑛𝑓�ꙍ 
We derive our conjectures using the following specification of the model: 𝐶(𝑒𝑖𝑃) = �𝑒𝑖𝑃�22 , 
𝑣(𝑙𝑖) = 𝛽𝑙𝑖 and for intrinsically motivated subjects we assume that 𝜗(𝑒𝑖𝑃) = 𝛾𝑒𝑖𝑃, where 𝛽 > 0 
and 𝛾 > 0. We provide details of our derivations in the online Appendix 1.  
Hypotheses 
We start by stating our hypotheses regarding the probationary period in which subjects could 
be fired by their supervisor. This corresponds to periods one to four in our experimental design. 
Our first conjecture relates to production levels and Internet usage. We expect that intrinsically 
motivated workers will be the only ones to dedicate time to productive effort in the fixed wage 
treatment (Treatment W). Indeed, for non-intrinsically motivated workers, the marginal cost of 
effort is always greater than the marginal product of effort (which is equal to zero) for any 
positive level of effort. In the individual incentives treatment (Treatment I), all workers are 
expected to provide productive effort as their marginal cost of effort is rewarded at their 
marginal product. As a result, we expect all workers, whether they are intrinsically motivated or 
not, to produce more and use Internet less in Treatment I than in Treatment W. In addition, under 
firing threats (Treatment F) we expect workers to produce more and browse the Internet less than 
in Treatment W. This is the case because non-intrinsically motivated workers will be willing to 
exert productive effort in order to signal themselves as intrinsically motivated workers to their 
supervisor in the probationary period. Indeed, workers who are not intrinsically motivated 
anticipate that the supervisor will be willing to fire non-intrinsically motivated workers since 
they will exert no effort in the tenure period. As a result, non-intrinsically motivated workers 
may be willing to mimic the behavior of intrinsically motivated workers so as to reduce the 
probability of being fired at the end of the probationary period. This will be a best response to 
the supervisor’s strategy whenever the cost of being fired (which is measured by the lost fixed 
wage) is high and the cost of providing effort to achieve the production levels of intrinsically 
motivated workers is low (see online Appendix 1).15 The comparison of Treatments I and F is 
more complex since non-intrinsically motivated workers may be interested in providing a level 
                                            
15 In particular see Case A,i and Cases B,i to B,iv.  
 
16 
of effort in the probationary period of the firing treatment which is higher than the efficient level 
of effort provided under individual incentives (see Table O.2 in online Appendix 1). This occurs 
when intrinsic motivation (𝛾) is particularly strong in which case intrinsically motivated workers 
without individual incentives would exert a higher level of effort than non-intrinsically motivated 
workers with individual incentives. In that case, non-intrinsically motivated workers, by 
mimicking the work effort of intrinsically motivated workers, would produce more in the firing 
treatment than in the treatment with individual incentives. 
We summarize these conjectures in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (Production levels and Internet usage) 
i) We expect workers’ production levels to be greater in the treatments with either individual 
incentives (I) or firing threats (F) than in the fixed wage treatment without firing (W). Also, we 
expect workers’ Internet usage to be lower in Treatments I and F than in Treatment W. 
ii) Workers’ production levels as well as Internet usage can either be greater or lower in the 
individual incentives treatment than in the treatment with firing threats.  
A necessary condition for the treatment with firing threats to lead to greater production levels 
and lower Internet usage than individual incentives is for intrinsic motivation (𝛾) to be 
sufficiently large. The treatment with individual incentives is expected to lead to greater 
production levels and lower Internet usage than the treatment with firing threats for moderate 
levels of intrinsic motivation. 
By distinguishing between productive (𝑒𝑖𝑃) and non-productive effort (𝑒𝑖~𝑃), our theoretical 
framework allows for impression management to arise in equilibrium. For example, consider the 
case of high-ability non-intrinsically motivated workers who decide to mimic the work behavior 
of low-ability intrinsically motivated workers in order to reduce their likelihood of being fired 
(see equilibria of types i and iii in Table O.1 in online Appendix 1). High-ability workers will be 
able to achieve the output of low-ability workers (𝑞𝐿) in a fraction (𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 < 1) of the time necessary 
for low-ability workers to do so. In the remaining time, high-ability workers will stay at their 
workstation exerting non-productive effort (𝑒𝑖~𝑃 > 0) in order to mimic the work behavior of 
low-ability workers. A consequence of impression management is that individual productivity 
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measured as individual production per unit of working time (𝑞𝑖
𝑒𝑖
) is expected to be lower in the 
firing treatment compared with Treatments W and I. We state our conjectures as follows.  
Hypothesis 2 (Impression management) 
We expect to observe impression management in the treatment with firing threats. As a result, we 
expect productivity levels to be lower with firing threats than in the other two treatments. 
Regarding firing decisions, our theoretical framework predicts that supervisors will dismiss 
workers with the lowest levels of performance since they signal low ability levels as well as a 
lack of intrinsic motivation of the workers. 
Hypothesis 3 (Firing decisions) 
We expect supervisors to fire the workers with the lowest levels of performance in the group. 
Following our theoretical framework, we also expect supervisors to shy away from monitoring 
activities in the treatments without firing threats (Treatments W and I) preferring either to work 
for cash or to browse the Internet. By contrast, in the firing treatment (F), monitoring workers’ 
production and effort levels is valuable to supervisors as it increases the probability of granting 
tenure to intrinsically motivated workers. We summarize this conjecture as follows. 
Hypothesis 4 (Monitoring) 
We expect the time spent by the supervisor monitoring workers to be greater in the treatment 
with firing threats than in the other two treatments.  
An important implication of our theoretical framework is that the effect of firing threats is 
expected to be observed for both low- and high- ability workers. Indeed, the incentives to signal 
oneself as an intrinsically motivated worker deserving tenure are present across ability levels. In 
particular, high-ability workers who are able to generate a level of output which exceeds their 
fixed wage may still be willing to produce beyond their fixed wage in the probationary period so 
as to signal their intrinsic motivation to the supervisor (see online Appendix 1, Case A,i and 
Cases B,i to B,iv). This is the case because the supervisor is willing to grant tenure to 
intrinsically motivated workers who will be producing a positive output in the tenure period. 
Low-ability workers may also respond positively to firing threats even though they are not able 
to produce as much as their fixed wage. This is the case because the supervisor would rather 
grant tenure to an intrinsically motivated low-ability worker than to a high-ability worker 
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without intrinsic motivation who would produce nothing in the tenure period. Our summarized 
conjectures follow.   
Hypothesis 5 (Firing threats and subjects’ ability) 
We expect the positive effect of firing threats on workers’ production levels and its negative 
effect on Internet usage to be observed across ability levels. 
In the last period of Treatment F which is referred to as the tenure period, firing threats are 
removed so that workers’ levels of production and Internet usage are expected to converge to the 
levels which are observed in Treatment W (see Table O.2 in online Appendix 1). Also, in the last 
period we expect supervisors to dedicate as little time to monitoring activities in Treatment F as 
in the other two treatments. This is the case because in the tenure period there is no firing 
decision to be made so that collecting information about workers’ performance becomes 
unnecessary. These conjectures are summarized in the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 6 (Tenure) 
i) In the last period of the experiment, we expect the production levels of workers not to be 
significantly different between the fixed wage treatment with firing threats (F) and the fixed wage 
treatment without firing (W). However, we expect the production levels of workers to be greater 
in the treatment with individual incentives (I) than in the other two treatments.    
ii) In the last period of the experiment, we expect Internet usage not to be significantly different 
between the fixed wage treatment with firing threats (F) and the fixed wage treatment without 
firing (W). However, we expect Internet usage of workers to be lower in the treatment with 
individual incentives (I) than in the other two treatments.   
iii) In the last period of the experiment, we expect the time spent by the supervisor monitoring 
workers to be the same across all treatments. 
4. RESULTS 
In Sections 4.1 to 4.4, we analyze the first four periods of our experiment which correspond to 
probationary periods in Treatment F.  We start the results section by comparing production and 
Internet usage across treatments. In Section 4.2, we study chat activities. Firing decisions are 
studied in subsequent sections. We analyze the last period of the experiment which corresponds 
to tenure in Treatment F in Section 4.5. 
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4.1. Production and Internet Usage 
We define total production on the work task as the total monetary amount generated by a 
subject’s answers on the task divided by the reward for each correct answer (40¢). Thus 
production is the total number of correct tables completed by a given subject minus 1/2 the 
number of incorrect tables. 
Production levels for B subjects were significantly higher under individual incentives (24.4) 
than under the treatments with firing threats (19.8) or fixed wages only (8.2) (see Table A.1 in 
the appendix for a detailed statistical analysis).  It is interesting to note that in the fixed wage 
treatment without firing, not only average individual production was strictly greater than zero but 
the great majority of subjects (82.0%) produced at least one correct table per period. This is 
consistent with the fact that workers may be intrinsically motivated to complete the task in the 
absence of incentives as we account for in our theoretical framework. In an independent survey, 
we report evidence of the importance of intrinsic motivation in the performance of subjects in 
our experimental environment.16 
In addition, B subjects were browsing the Internet significantly more in the fixed wage 
treatment (31.1% of their time) compared with the firing treatment (7.5%) or the individual 
incentives treatment (8.7%) (see Table A.2 in the appendix).17 We identify no significant 
differences in Internet usage between Treatments I and F. These findings support Hypothesis 1 
according to which firing threats tend to raise production levels and reduce Internet usage 
compared with the fixed wage treatment without firing. 
In Figure 4, we represent average production (left panel) and Internet usage (right panel) for 
the first four periods of our three treatments. We observe that average production under 
individual incentives surpassed production in the other two treatments in each of the four 
periods. Also, average production in the firing treatment was systematically higher than in the 
fixed wage treatment without firing threats. 
                                            
16 In particular, we show that the answer to the question “How much do you like mathematics?” was significantly 
correlated with subjects’ performance on the work task even after controlling for subjects’ ability levels (see online 
Appendix 2 for more details).  
17 Circumstantially, the proportion of their time subjects dedicated to Internet usage under fixed wages (31.1%) was 
similar to the figures published in the 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com according to which 
employees spend about 26.1% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski (2005)). Our results 
show that, even in a laboratory environment usually prone to generating demand effects, subjects were ready to 
undertake leisure activities for which they were not paid by the experimenter. 
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FIGURE 4.— Period-evolution of B subjects’ average production (left panel)  
and Internet usage (right panel) across treatments18 
 
Despite significant differences in production levels between the firing and the individual 
incentives treatments, Internet usage was remarkably similar in the two treatments (see Table 
A.2 in the appendix). In the first four periods of the experiment, when the threat of being fired 
was present in Treatment F, subjects browsed the Internet for 7.5% of their time in the firing 
treatment compared with 8.3% in the treatment with individual incentives. As a result, in the first 
four periods subjects spent as much time on the work task screen in the firing treatment (89.1%) 
as subjects did in the individual incentives treatment (90.7%) while producing significantly less 
(see Figure 4). In the fixed wage treatment without firing threats, B subjects spent only 50.8% of 
their time on average on the work task screen (see Table A.3 for a detailed statistical analysis of 
working time differences across treatments and periods). 
In other words, not only did subjects produce less in the firing treatment compared with the 
individual incentives treatment, but they also exhibited lower productivity levels. We assess 
productivity by computing average individual production for ten minutes of working time. 
Subjects of type B produced on average 1.8, 1.9 and 2.6 tables for ten minutes of working time in 
the fixed wage, firing and individual incentives treatments, respectively. It is important to note 
that working time in Treatment W was about half the working time in Treatments F and I 
                                            
18 We do not include subjects who had been fired before the current period. Our statistical analysis is robust to 
including or not including fired subjects (see Table A.1). 
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implying that productivity in Treatment W was not directly comparable with the productivity 
levels achieved in the other two treatments. This is the case because learning effects on the work 
task are significant as is illustrated by the positive trend in production in both Treatments F and I 
(see Figure 4).19 Thus, in order to test Hypothesis 2 we use a regression analysis in which we 
compare productivity levels across treatments while controlling for working time. In line with 
Hypothesis 2, we find that productivity levels in Treatment F were significantly lower than in the 
other two treatments (see Table A.4 in the appendix). 
RESULT 1 (Production and Internet usage) 
i) In line with Hypothesis 1i, production levels of B subjects were significantly greater in the 
treatment with firing threats and in the treatment with individual incentives than in the fixed 
wage treatment. Internet usage was significantly lower in the treatment with firing threats and in 
the treatment with individual incentives than in the fixed wage treatment. 
ii) Production levels of B subjects were significantly greater in the treatment with individual 
incentives than in the treatment with firing threats. No significant differences in Internet usage 
were identified between the treatment with firing threats and the treatment with individual 
incentives. 
iii) In line with Hypothesis 2, productivity levels of B subjects were significantly lower in the 
treatment with firing threats than in the treatment with individual incentives. Productivity levels 
of B subjects were also significantly lower in the treatment with firing threats than in the fixed 
wage treatment after controlling for working time differences across treatments. 
In addition to the work task and Internet browsing, subjects could obtain earnings from the 
clicking task. As we should expect, no significant differences were observed across treatments in 
this low-effort task. Subjects successfully clicked on the box in 94%, 96% and 95% of its 
appearances in Treatments W, F and I, resepectively (see online Appendix 3). 
4.2. Chat Activities 
In addition to Internet browsing, chatting activities could divert subjects’ attention from the 
work task. Chatting had no strategic function in this experiment except for the firing treatment in 
                                            
19 Using a Tobit regression with random effects with individual production as dependent variable and a constant and 
a trend as regressors, we find that the p-value associated with the trend coefficient was lower than 0.0001 for 
Treatments F and Treatment I. See also a related study by Corgnet et al. (2013) for evidence of learning effects on a 
similar task. 
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which case C subjects could use the chat room to define their firing policy and threaten B 
subjects.  The categorization of chat messages support the fact that the chat room was largely 
used as a distraction device. Each chat message was assigned to one of twenty-nine categories by 
two graduate students coding messages independently (see Table O.6 in online Appendix 4). 
Then, we computed the Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for each category to assess inter-rater 
agreement (see Table O.7 in online Appendix 4).20 We dropped category 29 from the analysis 
because it was empty and another four categories (categories 20, 21, 22, and 27) because the 
corresponding Cohen Kappa test was not significant at a 5% significance level. These categories 
represented only 7.9% of the messages (see Figure O.1 in online Appendix 4). The most 
represented category (35.3%) corresponds to distracting messages (e.g. jokes and stories). 
General and nonstrategic messages constituted the great majority (73.1%) of chat messages. We 
consider as general and nonstrategic messages the ones that were assigned to categories related 
to either presentation (category 1), distraction (categories 2, 3, 4 and 5) or general observations 
about the experiment (categories 24, 25 and 26). Most of the strategic messages consisted in 
subjects stating their own performance (category 15, 7.0% of all messages) and attempting to 
help other subjects complete the task (category 9, 6.2% of all messages). 
In summary, chatting activities were mostly leisurely activities. Indeed, similarly to Internet 
browsing, the average amount of time B subjects dedicated to chatting was significantly greater 
in the fixed wage treatment without firing (20.1%) than in Treatment F (1.2%) and Treatment I 
(0.5%) (see Table A.5 in the appendix for a statistical analysis). In the first four periods, chat 
usage of B subjects was significantly lower in firing and individual incentives treatments than in 
the fixed wage treatment without firing.  
Furthermore, we categorize messages according to the type of subjects (B or C) who sent and 
received the message. Interestingly, we observe that, in the treatment with firing threats, B 
subjects excluded the C subject from their messages in the majority of cases (54.8%). By 
contrast, this happened in only a small proportion of the cases in Treatments W (6.9%) and I 
(9.3%).21 In the firing treatment, B subjects may have excluded the C subject from their chat 
                                            
20 According to Landis and Koch (1977), Cohen Kappa coefficients between 0.4 and 0.6 correspond to a moderate 
agreement level and coefficients greater than 0.6 correspond to full agreement.  
21 We confirm the significance of these findings with a proportion test comparing Treatment F with Treatments W 
and I (p-value < 0.001). The p-value that corresponds to the comparison between Treatments W and I is equal to 
0.150. 
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discussions so as to avoid being caught by the C subject chatting instead of working.22 This 
suggests that firing threats led subjects to feel concerned not only about their production levels 
but also about their dedication to the work task. Employees were then inclined to influence 
positively the perception of their boss regarding their dedication to the work task. This behavior 
can be classified as impression management (see Newman (2009)).  
We summarize our findings regarding the chat analysis in Result 2. 
RESULT 2 (Chat activities) 
i) A large majority of messages had general and non-strategic content. 
ii) C subjects were largely excluded from B subjects’ chat discussions in the firing treatment 
while this was not the case in the other two treatments.    
iii) Chat was used significantly less in the firing treatment than in the fixed wage treatment. Also, 
chat usage was not significantly different between the firing treatment and the individual 
incentives treatment. 
4.3. Firing Decisions and Monitoring 
We turn now to the analysis of firing decisions of the C subjects in Treatment F. In Table 2 below 
we summarize the firing decisions of the C subjects across the six sessions of the firing treatment. 
 
TABLE 2. Summary of firing decisions per period. 
 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Total 
Total [maximum possible] 
number of fired subjects 
5 [6] 5 [6] 4 [6] 14 [18] 
Average production of 
subjects before being fired23 
0.10 0.87 1.50 6.00 
Average production 
of other B subjects 
3.19 3.29 3.53 19.80 
                                            
22 The messages excluding the C subjects were mostly general and non-strategic messages (66.5%, 70.0% and 
76.5% of messages in Treatments W, F and I). 
23 By multiplying these numbers by 40¢ one obtains the average monetary contribution of those subjects. It is 
evident that the average monetary contribution is well below the fixed wage of 200¢ received by B subjects at the 
beginning of each period. 
 
24 
P-value24 
0.1972 
[0.031] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
 
We observe that the B subjects who were fired in a given period were producing on average 
significantly less than the other B subjects in the organization. In line with Hypothesis 3, all the 
subjects who were fired in periods 2, 3 or 4 were the lowest producers in their respective 
sessions. In the cases in which several subjects produced the lowest amount on the work task 
(this occurred in four occasions), the subject who was finally fired was the one who was caught 
browsing the Internet more often during the period.  
Also, there is anecdotal evidence that chat conversations may have affected the C subject’s 
firing decisions. This was apparent in the first firing decision in Session 1 in which case two 
subjects produced the same low amount on the task and were both caught on the Internet.  
Subject B19 was fired after expressing the following opinions publicly in the chat room: “if C 
keeps being a rude passive aggressive boss; we can go on strike. If C fires all of us; C makes no 
income either”.  
The fact that C subjects fired B subjects according to their relative performance levels suggests 
that C subjects were monitoring B subjects to gather information about their production and 
dedication on the task. Indeed, following Hypothesis 4 we expect C subjects to monitor B 
subjects more intensively in the treatment with firing threats than in Treatments W and F (see 
Table 3).  We confirm this conjecture in a Tobit regression with a treatment dummy for firing 
threats (p-value = 0.031, See Table A.6 in the appendix).25 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
24 This p-value refers to the clustered t-test [Wilcoxon rank-sum test] that assesses whether average production is the 
same for subjects who were fired and for subjects who were not fired. 
25 When compared separately using Tobit regressions with treatment dummies, the average time spent by C subjects 
monitoring was significantly greater in the firing treatment than in the individual incentives treatment (p-
value=0.040). However, we did not find significant differences between the fixed wage treatment and the treatment 
with individual incentives (p-value=0.233) or between the fixed wage treatment and the firing treatment (p-
value=0.201). 
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TABLE 3. Period evolution of monitoring activities. 
Treatment 
Average time spent by  
C subjects monitoring  
(% of total time) 
Period 
1 
Period 
2 
Period 
3 
Period 
4 
Fixed wage only (W) 5.3% 7.6% 7.0% 2.6% 4.1% 
Firing threats (F) 12.2% 12.1% 18.2% 8.7% 9.8% 
Individual incentives (I) 2.5% 0.8% 3.4% 4.3% 1.7% 
 
We summarize our findings as follows. 
RESULT 3 (Firing and monitoring decisions) 
i) In line with Hypothesis 3, C subjects decided to fire the B subject with the lowest level of 
production in the period.  
ii) In line with Hypothesis 4, C subjects monitored B subjects significantly more in the treatment 
with firing threats than in both treatments without firing threats. 
4.4. The Effect of Firing Threats across Ability Levels 
We now investigate Hypothesis 5 by analyzing the effect of firing threats on subjects’ 
production across ability levels in the first four periods of the experiment. To do so, we classify 
B subjects as either high- or low- ability subjects depending on whether they completed their first 
table correctly (we obtain similar results by categorizing subjects according to their performance 
rank in the first period of the experiment). We rely on previous research showing the positive 
relationship between first table performance and subsequent production (see Corgnet et al., 2013 
and online Appendix 2). In particular, in an independent sample of 133 subjects involved in an 
experiment similar to the individual incentives treatment (I), Corgnet et al. (2013) show that 
production levels of subjects who answered the first table correctly (25.5) were 55% higher than 
the production levels of those who answered the first table incorrectly (16.5). Similar results hold 
for the current study in which production levels of subjects who answered the first table correctly 
(26.1) were 45% higher than the production levels of those who answered the first table 
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incorrectly (18.0).26 From a theoretical standpoint, we know that differences in production levels 
across subjects should attest differences in ability levels in the case of individual incentives. As a 
result, the fact that a subject’s success in completing the first table is highly correlated to his or 
her final production level indicates that such a measure captures ability differences.27 The 
proportion of B subjects characterized as high-ability subjects is equal to 65% for the whole 
sample and equal to 58%, 59% and 73% for Treatments W, F and I, respectively. We recognize 
that this measure can be affected by treatment effects. However, using proportion tests we do not 
find significant differences in the proportion of high-ability B subjects across treatments (the p-
values for comparing treatments W and F, W and I, and F and I, were equal to 0.7604, 0.3912, 
and 0.189, respectively). 
Both low- and high- ability B subjects produced more in the treatment with firing threats than 
in the fixed wage treatment as is illustrated in Figure 5 (see Table A.7 in the appendix for 
statistical analysis). In particular, Treatment F led to production levels which were on average 
three times (twice) larger than in Treatment W for low-ability (high-ability) subjects. In addition, 
Internet usage was reduced by 58.1% and 67.0% in Treatment F with respect to Treatment W for 
low- and high- ability subjects, respectively. In sum, in line with Hypothesis 5, the positive effect 
of firing threats on individual production and its negative impact on Internet usage held across 
ability levels. 
 
                                            
26 This difference was significant using either a clustered t-test or clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p-
value<0.0001). Note that all subjects completed at least one table.  
27 Interestingly, we also show using data from previous studies (Corgnet et al. 2013) that our measure of ability does 
not correlate with different measures of intrinsic motivation while correlating significantly with production levels 
(see Table O.4 in online Appendix 2). 
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FIGURE 5.— B subjects’ average production (left panel) and Internet usage (right panel) across 
ability levels and treatments28 
 
 We summarize our results as follows.  
RESULT 4 (Firing effects across ability levels) 
In line with Hypothesis 5, the positive effect of firing threats on production and its negative effect 
on Internet usage holds across ability levels. 
4.5. Tenure 
In the treatment with firing threats, average production decreased from 3.8 in the fourth period 
to 2.6 in the last (tenure) period reaching a level similar to the fixed wage treatment without 
firing (2.1). Average production in the last period was more than twice larger under individual 
incentives (6.1) than in the treatment with firing threats. We report no significant differences in 
last-period average production between the fixed wage treatment and the treatment with firing 
threats (see Table A.1 in the appendix). As a result, removing firing threats in Treatment F led to 
a collapse in B subjects’ production levels. This result is in line with Hypothesis 6i as well as 
with the experimental results reported by Falk, Huffman and MacLeod (2011). 
                                            
28 In Treatment F, we include all B subjects who were not fired before the end of the fourth period. That is, 45 out of 
54 B subjects. Note that our statistical analysis gives similar results whether we include or exclude fired subjects 
from the sample (see Table A.7 in the appendix). Production levels are computed excluding the performance on the 
first table which is used to classify subjects into ability levels.  
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In addition, Internet usage increased sharply from an average of 7.5% in the first four periods 
to 17.0% of total available time in the last period in the firing treatment (p-value = 0.002).29 
Internet usage did not increase significantly in the other two treatments. Similarly, chat usage 
increased from an average of 3.7% in the first four periods to 17.8% of total available time in the 
last period in the firing treatment (p-value < 0.001). In the last period, both Internet and chat 
usage were greater in the firing treatment than in the individual incentives treatment (see Tables 
A.2 and A.5 in the appendix). As a result, on-the-job leisure measured as the sum of chatting and 
Internet browsing soared in the last period to 34.8% of the time in the firing treatment (see 
Figure 6). Leisure activities were significantly more pronounced in the firing treatment (34.8%) 
and in the fixed wage treatment without firing (58.3%) than in the treatment with individual 
incentives (11.5%) (See Table A.3 in the appendix). This result is consistent with Hypothesis 6ii. 
 
FIGURE 6.— Evolution of the average time (in %) that B subjects who had not (yet) been fired 
spent either browsing or chatting. 
 
Finally, monitoring time decreased sharply in the firing treatment from an average of 12.2% in 
the first four periods to 5.2% in the last period. In line with Hypothesis 6iii, we find that there are 
no significant differences in monitoring time between the treatment with firing threats and the 
                                            
29 The reported p-value corresponds to the dummy regressor that takes value one for the last period and value zero 
for the previous periods in a Tobit regression with random effects. The dependent variable is the time spent on 
Internet by a given subject in a given period and the independent variables are the constant term and the last period 
dummy. Only the B subjects who had not been fired were included in the regression. For Treatments W and I, the p-
values of the last period dummy were equal to 0.900 and 0.144, respectively. A similar conclusion can be obtained 
by using dummies for each period (see Table A.8 in the appendix).  
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other two treatments in Period 5 (see Table A.6 in the appendix). We summarize our findings 
regarding the tenure period as follows. 
RESULT 5 (Tenure) 
i) In line with Hypothesis 6i, in the last period, individual production was not significantly 
different between the fixed wage treatment and the treatment with firing threats. Individual 
production was significantly lower in the firing treatment than in the treatment with individual 
incentives. 
ii) In line with Hypothesis 6ii, in the last period, Internet usage (as well as chatting) was 
significantly greater in the treatment with firing threats than in the treatment with individual 
incentives. No significant differences in Internet usage (as well as chatting) were identified 
between the firing treatment and the fixed wage treatment.  
iii) In line with Hypothesis 6iii, monitoring time was not significantly different between the 
treatment with firing threats and the other two treatments. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of firing threats and tenure in a virtual organization 
characterized by real-effort tasks, access to leisure activities and real-time supervision. We 
showed that the introduction of firing threats significantly affected organizational behavior. In 
particular, production was more than twice higher in the presence of firing threats than in their 
absence while Internet usage, as well as chatting activities, were almost eradicated. Also, firing 
threats positively affected production levels of both low- and high- ability workers. These results 
show that even though firing threats were limited to a maximum of one-third of the labor force 
(three out of nine workers), they positively affected the work effort of all employees. 
Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats produced significantly less than 
organizations in which individual incentives were used. Interestingly, organizations endowed 
with firing threats did not differ from those using individual incentives in terms of leisure 
activities (Internet browsing and chatting). These results suggest that employees facing firing 
threats were willing to appear to their bosses as hard-working individuals spending a 
considerable amount of time (89.1%) on the work task screen. According to our theoretical 
framework, a consequence of such signaling behaviors is the reduced productivity of workers in 
the firing treatment with respect to fixed wages and individual incentives. We were able to 
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confirm this conjecture. In particular, the time spent on the work task screen was the same under 
firing threats and individual incentives while production levels were about 25% lower in the 
former case. These findings suggest that under firing threats, employees were willing to signal 
themselves as hard-working individuals who spend long hours at their workstation without 
browsing the Internet. 
Consistent with this interpretation, we stressed in our analysis of chatting activities that 
workers facing firing threats were very reluctant to include their boss in their communications to 
other employees. This seems to indicate that employees feared the negative consequences of 
being caught by their boss either chatting or browsing instead of working. 
Finally, we report a collapse in production levels as well as a surge in Internet browsing and 
chatting in the final (tenure) period of the treatment with firing threats. This result is consistent 
with our theoretical framework according to which non-intrinsically motivated workers who 
successfully signal themselves as intrinsically motivated workers in the probationary periods will 
reduce their work effort in the tenure period. 
Our results provide clear evidence of the incentive effects of firing threats which are 
commonly used in real work environments. At the same time, we emphasize that firing threats 
may backfire by inducing employees to engage in impression management activities. As a result, 
employers may inadvertently grant tenure to unmotivated workers leading to a collapse in firm 
performance.    
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7. APPENDIX 
In order to assess any statistical differences in individual production or Internet usage across 
treatments, we use a series of statistical tests that account for the specific nature of our data. 
More specifically, we use modifications of standard t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to the 
case of clustered data. The clustered version of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed using 
Datta and Satten test (2005).30 
TABLE A.1 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) 
assessing differences in period production across treatments. 
 Tests Total Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
B 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.005 (0.041) 
0.033 
(0.066) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.038 
(0.044) 
0.004 
(0.032) 
0.587 
(0.744) 
Excluding 
fired 
subjects31 
0.007 
0.0280 - - 
0.017 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.135 
(0.165) 
W vs. I 0.000 (0.007) 
0.012 
(0.042) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
F vs. I 0.009 (0.020) 
0.335 
(0.360) 
0.118 
(0.133) 
0.018 
(0.054) 
0.040 
(0.032) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
Excluding 
fired 
subjects 
0.014 
(0.030) - - 
0.015 
(0.058) 
0.106 
(0.077) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
C 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 
0.748 
(0.855) 
0.928 
(0.999) 
0.986 
(0.782) 
0.536 
(0.926) 
0.418 
(0.464) 
0.155 
(0.133) 
W vs. I 0.543 (0.792) 
0.400 
(0.645) 
0.470 
(0.647) 
0.427 
(0.782) 
0.884 
(0.999) 
0.634 
(0.713) 
F vs. I 0.398 (0.688) 
0.411 
(0.809) 
0.488 
(0.518) 
0.703 
(0.999) 
0.409 
(0.520) 
0.226 
(0.518) 
 
  
                                            
30 Datta and Satten (2005) as well as Galbraith, Daniel and Vissel (2010) provided us with R codes for the test. The 
codes for the clustered t-test in R were provided by Frank Harrell who implemented the procedure used in Donner, 
Birkett and Buck (1981). 
31 The p-values corresponding to the case “Excluding fired subjects” is such that all B subjects who had been fired 
before the end of the fourth period were removed from the sample.  
 
34 
TABLE A.2 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) assessing 
differences in internet usage across treatments. 
 Tests Total Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
B 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.000 (0.009) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
(0.191) 
(0.062) 
0.370 
(0.624) 
Excluding 
fired subjects 
0.000 
(0.009) - - 
0.000 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.229 
(0.156) 
W vs. I 0.000 (0.005) 
0.012 
(0.042) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.0141) 
F vs. I 0.267 (0.411) 
0.753 
(0.695) 
0.322 
(0.773) 
0.189 
(0.337) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
Excluding 
fired subjects 
0.775 
(0.646) - - 
0.690 
(0.661) 
0.672 
(0.156) 
0.188 
(0.178) 
C 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.229 (0.429) 
0.095 
(0.082) 
0.408 
(0.931) 
0.930 
(0.931) 
0.172 
(0.329) 
0.430 
(0.609) 
W vs. I 0.345 (0.429) 
0.009 
(0.034) 
0.585 
(0.931) 
0.690 
(0.999) 
0.428 
(0.662) 
0.624 
(0.690) 
F vs. I 0.745 (0.937) 
 0.067 
(0.132) 
0.559 
(0.818) 
0.637 
(0.937) 
0.485 
(0.690) 
0.548 
(0.999) 
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TABLE A.3 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) assessing 
differences in working time (or leisure time) across treatments. 
 Tests Total Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
B 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.000 (0.009) 
0.005 
(0.029) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
(0.191) 
(0.062) 
0.370 
(0.624) 
Excluding 
fired 
subjects 
0.000 
(0.009) - - 
0.000 
(0.016) 
0.000 
(0.018) 
0.229 
(0.156) 
W vs. I 0.000 (0.005) 
0.012 
(0.042) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.007) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.0141) 
F vs. I 0.267 (0.411) 
0.753 
(0.695) 
0.322 
(0.773) 
0.189 
(0.337) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
0.000 
(0.011) 
Excluding 
fired 
subjects 
0.775 
(0.646) - - 
0.690 
0.661 
0.672 
(0.156) 
0.188 
(0.178) 
C 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.229 (0.429) 
0.095 
(0.082*) 
0.408 
(0.931) 
0.930 
(0.931) 
0.172 
(0.329) 
0.430 
(0.609) 
W vs. I 0.345 (0.429) 
0.009 
(0.034) 
0.585 
(0.931) 
0.690 
(0.999) 
0.428 
(0.662) 
0.624 
(0.690) 
F vs. I 0.745 (0.937) 
 0.067 
(0.132) 
0.559 
(0.818) 
0.637 
(0.937) 
0.485 
(0.690) 
0.548 
(0.999) 
 
 
TABLE A.4 Tobit regression with random effects for individual productivity 
(periods 1 to 4) across treatments.32 
 Treatment F vs. I Treatment F vs. W 
Intercept -0.016 -0.081** 
Treatment F -0.067*** -0.050** 
Working time 
(in minutes) 0.014*** 0.017*** 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 480 
(63 left censored) 
L = -24.777,  
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 440 
(76 left censored) 
L = -25.176,  
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
Treatment F is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for Treatment F and 0 otherwise 
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
 
 
  
                                            
32 These results are robust to alternative specifications including non-linear specifications of working time. 
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TABLE A.5 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) assessing 
differences in chat usage across treatments. 
 Tests Total Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5 
B 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.000 (0.006) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.745 
(0.740) 
Excluding 
fired 
subjects 
0.000 
(0.004) - - 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.161 
(0.205) 
W vs. I 0.000 (0.002) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
F vs. I 0.001 (0.020) 
0.492 
(0.156) 
0.924 
(0.201) 
0.135 
(0.248) 
0.000 
(0.061) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
Excluding 
fired 
subjects 
0.240 
(0.220) - - 
0.971 
(0.574) 
0.491 
(0.278) 
0.007 
(0.138) 
C 
subjects 
only 
W vs. F 0.553 (0.931) 
0.707 
(0.662) 
0.763 
(0.931) 
0.505 
(0.999) 
0.931 
(0.631) 
0.798 
(0.762) 
W vs. I 0.133 (0.082) 
0.124 
(0.004) 
0.130 
(0.125) 
0.223 
(0.125) 
0.142 
(0.125) 
0.832 
(0.762) 
F vs. I 0.065 (0.067) 
0.064 
(0.065) 
0.083 
(0.093) 
0.203 
(0.240) 
0.129 
(0.093) 
0.965 
(0.699) 
 
 
TABLE A.6 Tobit regression with random effects for monitoring time (in seconds).  
 Probationary periods
33 
Periods 1-4 
Tenure 
Period 5 
Intercept 11.553 -10.867 
Treatment F 115.707** 64.667 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 68 
(18 left censored) 
L = -668.2 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.046 
n = 16 
(6 left censored) 
L = -132.0 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.175 
Treatment F is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for Treatment F and 0 otherwise 
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
 
 
  
                                            
33 These results are robust to introducing period dummies. 
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TABLE A.7 P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) 
assessing differences in individual production and internet usage across 
treatments and ability levels. 
 Individual production per period 
Internet usage 
per period 
   Low-ability High-ability Low-ability High-ability 
W vs. F 0.067 (0.548) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
0.016 
(0.054) 
0.010 
(0.041) 
Excluding fired 
subjects 
0.019 
(0.165) 
0.003 
(0.028) 
0.009 
(0.056) 
0.012 
(0.034) 
W vs. I 0.005 (0.043) 
0.001 
(0.043) 
0.000 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.068) 
F vs. I 0.188 (0.075) 
0.259 
(0.209) 
0.063 
(0.136) 
0.895 
(0.489) 
Excluding fired 
subjects 
0.432 
0.245 
0.939 
0.375 
0.208 
0.472 
0.437 
0.464 
 
 
 
TABLE A.8 Tobit regression with random effects for internet usage per period for B 
subjects only. 
 Fixed Wages  (W) 
Firing 
 (F) 
Individual incentives 
(I) 
Intercept 280.475*** 102.570*** 88.823*** 
Period 2 136.353** -36.681 18.136 
Period 3 136.119** -6.200 27.966 
Period 4 156.51*** 15.515 -2.899 
Period 5 148.247*** 117.186*** 33.660 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 216 
(5 right censored) 
L = -9913.297 
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 238 
(0 right censored) 
L = -3206.362 
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 270 
(0 right censored) 
L = -3624.998 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.498 
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01. 
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8. APPENDIX ONLINE (ONLINE APPENDIX) 
ONLINE.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK (PROOFS) 
We consider the following specification of the model: 𝐶(𝑒𝑖𝑃) = �𝑒𝑖𝑃�22 , 𝑣(𝑙𝑖) = 𝛽𝑙𝑖 and for 
intrinsically motivated subjects we take 𝜗(𝑒𝑖𝑃) = 𝛾𝑒𝑖𝑃, where 𝛽 > 0 and 𝛾 > 0. Also, we 
consider that 𝛼𝐿 ≥ 𝛽, 𝛾 ≥ 𝛽, and 𝛼𝐻 + 𝛾 − 𝛽 ≤ 𝜑.  
We denote by 𝑁𝑗,𝑅 (𝑁𝑗,~𝑅) the set of (not) intrinsically motivated workers of ability j𝜖{𝐿,𝐻}, 
and 𝑛𝑗,𝑅 (𝑛𝑗,~𝑅) stands for the number of (not) intrinsically motivated workers of ability 𝑗𝜖{𝐿,𝐻}. 
Also, we use the notation ⟨𝑗|𝑅⟩ (⟨𝑗|~𝑅⟩) to refer to an (not) intrinsically motivated worker of 
ability j𝜖{𝐿,𝐻}. We also refer to a (not) intrinsically motivated supervisor as 𝑠𝑅 (𝑠~𝑅). 
In the absence of firing threats, we derive the following equilibrium values for workers’ and 
supervisors’ activities by solving the corresponding first order conditions for any 𝑡𝜖{1,2}. 
Fixed wage treatment (Treatment W) 
For any 𝑡𝜖{1,2} and any for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 the 
equilibrium decisions are as follows: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝑊𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝑊𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝑊𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝑊𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝑊~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝑊~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝑊~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝑊~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 � 
�
𝑒𝑠~𝑅,𝑊𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 − 𝛽
𝑒𝑠𝑅,𝑊𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝑊∗(𝑡) = 0   ��  
𝑒𝑠~𝑅,𝑊~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒𝑠𝑅,𝑊~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝑊∗(𝑡) = 0� 
Individual incentives treatment (Treatment I) 
For any 𝑡𝜖{1,2} and for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅, and for any 
𝑠𝜖{𝐿,𝐻}  the equilibrium decisions are as follows: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐼𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐻 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐼𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐿 − 𝛽
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐼𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐻 + 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐼𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐿 + 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐼~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐼~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐼~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐼~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 � 
�
𝑒𝑠~𝑅,𝐼𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 − 𝛽
𝑒𝑠𝑅,𝐼𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐼∗(𝑡) = 0   ��  
𝑒𝑠~𝑅,𝐼~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒𝑠𝑅,𝐼~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐼∗(𝑡) = 0 � 
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Firing treatment (Treatment F)  
We make the following simplifying assumption. We assume that 𝑚� < 𝜑 − (𝛼𝐻 + 𝛾 − 𝛽) so 
that supervisors can monitor workers while exerting their optimal level of effort. Therefore, 
similarly to the other two treatments, the optimal level of effort for the supervisor is always as 
follows: 
� 𝑒𝑠~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 − 𝛽
𝑒𝑠𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒𝑠~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃
∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒𝑠𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0  � 
Note that the supervisors’ level of effort is always rewarded at its marginal product. The 
opportunity cost of monitoring workers is then going to be captured by the loss in utility incurred 
from supervising in lieu of browsing the Internet (𝑚�𝛽). 
In order to disregard the case in which intrinsically motivated workers engage in signaling 
behaviors, we consider that the maximum level of production that can be achieved by a low-
ability [high-ability] worker is equal to (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 [(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻].34 Also, we consider that (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 < ꙍ ≤  (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻, so the supervisor is (not) interested in firing low (high) ability 
workers if they can be identified. Note that we also assume that fixed wages (ꙍ) cannot be lower 
than the expected value of production in period 2 of a worker selected at random. That is: 
ꙍ > (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼�, where 𝛼� = 𝑛𝐿,𝑅𝛼𝐿+𝑛𝐻,𝑅𝛼𝐻
𝑛
. As a result, even if supervisors do not monitor workers 
they will be willing to fire subjects at random. Note that relaxing this assumption would not 
affect the qualitative nature of our predictions. 
We denote 𝑛�𝑓 the maximum number of workers who can be fired. We detail our derivations 
below.35  
○ Case A. We consider 𝑛� 𝑓 ≥ 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅  
□ i) Signaling equilibrium. In that case, non-intrinsically motivated workers may actually decide 
to provide productive effort in the first period. In particular, high-ability workers may want to 
signal themselves to supervisors as intrinsically motivated high-ability workers so as to avoid 
being fired for sure at the end of the first period. Non-intrinsically motivated low-ability workers 
                                            
34 This corresponds to the level of output produced by an intrinsically motivated worker of low [high] ability in the 
absence of signaling concerns. In our experimental setting, this could be seen as the maximum number of tables that 
a subject is allowed to complete. Similar results can be obtained by imposing the following restriction on the total 
amount of time available to workers: 𝜑 ≤ 𝛾 − 𝛽. 
35 Note that we only consider pure-strategy equilibria. 
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will not be willing to engage in signaling since 𝑛� 𝑓 ≥ 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅 (and (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 < ꙍ) implies that 
mimicking intrinsically motivated low-ability workers will not prevent low-ability workers to be 
fired. Non-intrinsically motivated high-ability workers will be willing to signal themselves as 
intrinsically motivated high-ability workers as long as the following condition is satisfied:  
ꙍ ≥
(𝛾−𝛽)(𝛾+𝛽)
2(1−𝜋∗�𝑖𝐻�)    (1𝐴)   
where 𝜋∗(𝑖𝐻) = 𝑛𝑓∗−𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐻  is the probability that a high-ability worker will be fired in an equilibrium 
of type (i). Note that in equilibrium, 
𝑛𝑓
∗ = 𝑛𝐿 𝑖𝑓 ꙍ ≤ 𝑛𝐻,𝑅𝑛𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 
and 
𝑛𝑓
∗ = 𝑛�𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
Also for this equilibrium to hold it has to be the case that expected value of production of a 
high-ability worker (either intrinsically or non-intrinsically motivated) is larger than the 
production of an intrinsically motivated low-ability worker. This condition is stated as follows: 
𝑛𝐻,𝑅
𝑛𝐻
𝛼𝐻 > 𝛼𝐿  (2𝐴) 
If this condition does not hold then a high-ability worker would automatically deviate and 
mimic an intrinsically motivated low-ability worker. 
The signaling strategy follows by non-intrinsically motivated high-ability workers will be 
profitable as long as the supervisor engages in monitoring in the first period. This will hold if the 
following condition comparing the expected payoffs between monitoring and not monitoring (in 
period 1) is satisfied: 
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + �1 − 𝜋∗(𝑖𝐻)�𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 − �𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼� − �𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝑓∗�ꙍ           
(3𝐴) 
If condition (3𝐴) does not hold equilibrium effort decisions are the same as in Treatment W. In 
that case, the supervisor would fire 𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random.   
As a result, when conditions (1𝐴), (2𝐴) and (3𝐴)  hold, a signaling equilibrium in Case A 
exists and is characterized as follows, for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and 
ℎ𝑁𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑁𝑅: 
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� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑁𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 � 
In equilibrium, all low-ability workers are fired. In case that ꙍ > 𝑛𝐻,𝑅
𝑛𝐻
(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻,  the 
supervisor will fire (𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝐿) high-ability workers at random. If this condition does not hold then 
the supervisor will only fire low-ability workers in which case 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛𝐿. 
□ ii) No-signaling equilibrium. In the absence of a signaling equilibrium, if the following 
condition holds:  
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 − �𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼� +�𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅�ꙍ    (4𝐴) 
there exists an equilibrium characterized as follows, for any 𝑡𝜖{1,2} and for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, 
ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠𝑁𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠𝑁𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 � 
and 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅 so that all workers but the high-ability intrinsically motivated workers are 
fired in equilibrium. 
This equilibrium holds whenever condition (4𝐴) below holds: 
If condition (4𝐴) does not hold then the supervisor will not monitor workers. In that case, 
equilibrium effort decisions would be the same as in Treatment W and the supervisor would fire 
𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random. 
○ Case B. We consider 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐿,𝑅 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅 ≤ 𝑛� 𝑓 < 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅. In this case, non-intrinsically 
motivated low-ability workers may also engage in signaling activities along with non-
intrinsically motivated high-ability workers. In turn, high-ability workers without intrinsic 
motivation will be interested in either mimicking low- or high- ability workers with intrinsic 
motivation.  
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There exist four types of pure-strategy signaling equilibria:36  
i.  Both low- and high- ability workers without intrinsic motivation mimic low-ability 
workers with intrinsic motivation. 
ii.  High-ability workers without intrinsic motivation mimic high-ability workers with 
intrinsic motivation while low-ability workers without intrinsic motivation mimic low-
ability workers with intrinsic motivation. 
iii.  High-ability workers without intrinsic motivation mimic low-ability workers with 
intrinsic motivation. 
iv.  High-ability workers without intrinsic motivation mimic high-ability workers with 
intrinsic motivation. 
In addition, there exists an equilibrium without signaling (v) in which case non-intrinsically 
motivated workers do not mimic the behavior of intrinsically motivated workers. 
□ An equilibrium of type (i) occurs if the following conditions are met: 
First, workers of type ⟨𝐿|~𝑅⟩ are willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
ꙍ ≥
(𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2 �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝐿,𝑅��    (𝑖1) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑖𝐿,𝑅� is the probability that a low-ability worker with intrinsic motivation will be fired 
in an equilibrium of type (i), that is 𝜋∗�𝑖𝐿,𝑅� = 𝑛𝑓∗𝑛−𝑛𝐻,𝑅. Note that in equilibrium, 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛�𝑓 . 
Second, workers of type ⟨𝐻|~𝑅⟩ are willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩ while not 
mimicking type ⟨𝐻|𝑅⟩: 2(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛽 + �𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)�22 �1 − 𝜋�𝑖𝐿,𝑅�� ≤ ꙍ < (𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2    (𝑖2) 
This will hold as long as 𝜋�𝑖𝐿,𝑅� is low enough. This will require a low proportion of high-
ability workers who are intrinsically motivated to ensure that 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅 is high. 
                                            
36 The type of equilibrium in which only low-ability workers mimic intrinsically motivated workers does not exist 
since it is less costly for high-ability workers to mimic intrinsically motivated workers for the same gains in terms of 
reduced probability of being fired. 
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The signaling equilibrium will hold if the following condition comparing the expected payoffs 
between monitoring and not monitoring (in period 1) is satisfied so that monitoring occurs in 
equilibrium:  
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + �𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 + 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + �1 − 𝜋�𝑖𝐿,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐿,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 −
�𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼�     (𝑖3) 
If condition (𝑖3) does not hold then the supervisor will not monitor workers. In that case, 
equilibrium effort decisions would be the same as in Treatment W and the supervisor would fire 
𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random. 
When conditions (𝑖1), (𝑖2) and (𝑖3)  hold, a signaling equilibrium of type (i) exists and is 
characterized as follows,  for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹
~𝑃∗(1) = �1 − 𝛼𝐿
𝛼𝐻
� (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠𝑁𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠𝑁𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 � 
and 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛�𝑓 such that 𝑛�𝑓 workers are fired at random among those who are not high-ability 
intrinsically motivated workers. 
□ An equilibrium of type (ii) occurs if the following conditions are met: 
First, workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑁𝑅⟩ are willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
ꙍ ≥
(𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2(1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅�)    (𝑖𝑖1) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅� is the probability that a worker identified as a low-ability worker with intrinsic 
motivation will be fired by the supervisor in an equilibrium of type (ii), that is 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅� =
𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑛𝑓∗
𝑛𝐿
; 1}.  
Second, workers of type ⟨𝐻|~𝑅⟩ mimic workers of type ⟨𝐻|𝑅⟩ while not mimicking type 
⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
 
44 
(𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2(1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐻,𝑅�) ≤ ꙍ <  2(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛽 + �
𝛼𝐿
𝛼𝐻
(𝛾 − 𝛽)�22�1 − min { 𝑛𝑓∗ + 1𝑛𝐿 + 1 ;  𝑛�𝑓𝑛𝐿 + 1 ; 1}�     (𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐻,𝑅� is the probability that a high-ability worker with intrinsic motivation will be fired 
in an equilibrium of type (ii). Note that in equilibrium,  
𝑛𝑓
∗ = min {𝑛�𝑓;𝑛𝐿} 𝑖𝑓 ꙍ ≤ 𝑛𝐻,𝑅𝑛𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 
in which case 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐻,𝑅� = 0, and 
𝑛𝑓
∗ = 𝑛�𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
in which case 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐻,𝑅� = max �𝑛𝑓∗−𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐻 ; 0�. 
The signaling equilibrium will hold if the following condition comparing the expected payoffs 
between monitoring and not monitoring in period 1 is satisfied so that monitoring occurs in 
equilibrium:  
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 + �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐻,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 +
�1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐿,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 − �𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼� − �𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝑓∗�ꙍ     (𝑖𝑖3) 
If condition (𝑖𝑖3) does not hold then the supervisor will not monitor workers. In that case, 
equilibrium effort decisions would be the same as in Treatment W and the supervisor would fire 
𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random. 
As a result, when conditions (𝑖𝑖1), (𝑖𝑖2) and (𝑖𝑖3)  hold, a signaling equilibrium of type (ii) 
exists and is characterized as follows, for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and 
ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 �  
In equilibrium, low-ability workers are fired first. In case there is less low-ability workers than 
the maximum number of workers that can be fired (𝑛�𝑓), the supervisor will fire (𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝐿) high-
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ability workers at random as long as ꙍ > 𝑛𝐻,𝑅
𝑛𝐻
(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻. That is, if this condition is satisfied 
then 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛� 𝑓. If this condition does not hold (ꙍ ≤ 𝑛𝐻,𝑅𝑛𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻) then the supervisor will only 
fire low-ability workers in which case 𝑛𝑓∗ = min {𝑛𝐿 ,𝑛�𝑓}. 
□ An equilibrium of type (iii) occurs if the following conditions are met: 
First, workers of type ⟨𝐿|~𝑅⟩ are not willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
ꙍ < (𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2�1 − 𝑛𝑓∗–𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 1𝑛𝐿,𝑅 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 + 1 �    (𝑖𝑖𝑖1) 
Second, workers of type ⟨𝐻|~𝑅⟩ are willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩ while not 
mimicking type ⟨𝐻|𝑅⟩: 2(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛽 + �𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)�22 �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅�� ≤ ꙍ < (𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2   (𝑖𝑖𝑖2) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅� is the probability that a low-ability worker with intrinsic motivation will be fired 
in an equilibrium of type (iii), that is 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅� = 𝑛𝑓∗ –𝑛𝐿,~𝑅𝑛𝐿,𝑅+𝑛𝐻,~𝑅. Note that in equilibrium, 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛�𝑓. 
This will hold as long as 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅� is low enough. This will require a high proportion of high-
ability workers who are not intrinsically motivated so that 𝑛𝐿,𝑅 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 is high and 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅� is 
low. 
The signaling equilibrium will hold if the following condition comparing the expected payoffs 
between monitoring and not monitoring in period 1 is satisfied so that monitoring occurs in 
equilibrium:  
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐿,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 −
�𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼�     (𝑖𝑖𝑖3) 
If condition (𝑖𝑖𝑖3) does not hold then the supervisor will not monitor workers. In that case, 
equilibrium effort decisions would be the same as in Treatment W and the supervisor would fire 
𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random. 
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As a result, when conditions (𝑖𝑖𝑖1), (𝑖𝑖𝑖2)  and (𝑖𝑖𝑖3)  hold, a signaling equilibrium of type (iii) 
exists and is characterized as follows, for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙𝑁𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and 
ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹
~𝑃∗(1) = �1 − 𝛼𝐿
𝛼𝐻
� (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 � 
and 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛�𝑓. In equilibrium, low-ability workers who are not intrinsically motivated will be fired 
first and, at random, 𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 workers will be fired among the remaining workers who are not 
high-ability intrinsically motivated workers. 
□ An equilibrium of type (iv) occurs if the following conditions are met: 
First, a necessary condition for an equilibrium of type (iv) to exist is:  
𝑛𝐻,𝑅
𝑛𝐻
𝛼𝐻 ≥ 𝛼𝐿       (𝑖𝑣1) 
since workers of type ⟨𝐻|~𝑅⟩ would not be willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐻|𝑅⟩ in 
equilibrium otherwise. Instead, they would rather mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩. 
Second, workers of type ⟨𝐿|~𝑅⟩ are not willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
ꙍ < (𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2�1 − min �𝑛𝑓∗–𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 1𝑛𝐿,𝑅 + 1 ; 1��    (𝑖𝑣2) 
Third, workers of type ⟨𝐻|~𝑅⟩ mimic workers of type ⟨𝐻|𝑅⟩ while not mimicking type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
(𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2(1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑣𝐻,𝑅�) ≤ ꙍ <  2(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛽 + �
𝛼𝐿
𝛼𝐻
(𝛾 − 𝛽)�2
2 �1 − 𝑛𝑓∗–𝑛𝐿,~𝑅𝑛𝐿,𝑅 + 1 �     (𝑖𝑣3) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑣𝐻,𝑅� is the probability that a high-ability worker with intrinsic motivation will be fired 
in an equilibrium of type (iv), that is: 
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𝜋∗�𝑖𝑣𝐻,𝑅� = 0 𝑖𝑓 ꙍ ≤ 𝑛𝐻,𝑅𝑛𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 
and 
𝜋∗�𝑖𝑣𝐻,𝑅� = max {𝑛𝑓∗ − 𝑛𝐿𝑛𝐻 ; 0} 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
The signaling equilibrium will hold if the following condition comparing the expected payoffs 
between monitoring and not monitoring in period 1 is satisfied so that monitoring occurs in 
equilibrium:  
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑣𝐻,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑖𝑣𝐿,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐿,𝑅(𝛾 −
𝛽)𝛼𝐿 − �𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼� − �𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝑓∗�ꙍ     (𝑖𝑣4) 
If condition (𝑖𝑣4) does not hold then the supervisor will not monitor workers. In that case, 
equilibrium effort decisions would be the same as in Treatment W and the supervisor would fire 
𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random. 
As a result, when conditions (𝑖𝑣1), (𝑖𝑣2), (𝑖𝑣3), and (𝑖𝑣4) hold, a signaling equilibrium of type 
(iv) exists and is characterized as follows, for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 𝑙𝑅~𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and 
ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅: 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(2) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(2) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠~𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 � 
In equilibrium, low-ability workers are fired first. In case there is less low-ability workers than 
the maximum number of workers that can be fired, the supervisor will fire (𝑛�𝑓 − 𝑛𝐿) high-ability 
workers at random as long as ꙍ > 𝑛𝐻,𝑅
𝑛𝐻
(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻. That is, if this condition is satisfied then 
𝑛𝑓
∗ = 𝑛� 𝑓. If the previous condition does not hold (ꙍ ≤ 𝑛𝐻,𝑅𝑛𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻) then the supervisor will 
only fire low-ability workers in which case 𝑛𝑓∗ = min {𝑛𝐿 ,𝑛�𝑓}. 
□ No-signaling equilibrium (v). The equilibrium is characterized as follows. 
First, workers of type ⟨𝐿|~𝑅⟩ are not willing to mimic workers of type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩: 
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ꙍ < (𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2�1 − 𝑛𝑓∗–𝑛𝐿,~𝑅–𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 + 1𝑛𝐿,𝑅 + 1 �    (𝑣1) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑣𝐿,𝑅� is the probability that a low-ability worker with intrinsic motivation will be fired 
in a no-signaling equilibrium, that is 𝜋∗�𝑣𝐿,𝑅� = 𝑛𝑓∗ –𝑛𝐿,~𝑅–𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝑛−𝑛𝐻,𝑅 . 
Second, workers of type ⟨𝐻|~𝑅⟩ are not willing to mimic workers of either type ⟨𝐿|𝑅⟩ or type 
⟨𝐻|𝑅⟩: 
ꙍ < min 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧(𝛾 − 𝛽)(𝛾 + 𝛽)2 ; 2(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛽 + �𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽)�
2
2�1 − 𝑛𝑓∗–𝑛𝐿,~𝑅–𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 + 1𝑛𝐿,𝑅 + 1 �⎭⎪⎬
⎪
⎫    (𝑣2) 
The no-signaling equilibrium with monitoring will hold if the following condition comparing 
the expected payoffs between monitoring and not monitoring (in period 1) is satisfied so that 
monitoring occurs in equilibrium:  
𝑐̅ ≤ −𝑚�𝛽 + 𝑛𝐻,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐻 + �1 − 𝜋∗�𝑣𝐿,𝑅�� 𝑛𝐿,𝑅(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼𝐿 − �𝑛 − 𝑛�𝑓�(𝛾 − 𝛽)𝛼�      (𝑣3) 
where 𝜋∗�𝑣𝐿,𝑅� is the probability that a low-ability worker with intrinsic motivation will be fired 
in a no-signaling equilibrium, that is 𝜋∗�𝑣𝐿,𝑅� = 𝑛𝑓∗ –𝑛𝐿,~𝑅–𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝑛−𝑛𝐻,𝑅 . 
If condition (𝑣3) does not hold then the supervisor will not monitor workers. In that case, 
equilibrium effort decisions would be the same as in Treatment W and the supervisor would fire 
𝑛� 𝑓 workers at random. 
As a result, when conditions (𝑣1), (𝑣2), and (𝑣3) hold, a no-signaling equilibrium of type (v) 
exists and is characterized as follows, for any 𝑡𝜖{1,2} and for any worker 𝑙𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,𝑅, ℎ𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐻,𝑅 , 
𝑙~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅 and ℎ~𝑅𝜖𝑁𝐿,~𝑅:  
� 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 � 
� 𝑚𝑠𝑁𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(1) = 𝑚�  � 𝑚𝑠𝑁𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 𝑚𝑠𝑅,𝐹∗(2) = 0 � 
 
49 
and 𝑛𝑓∗ = 𝑛�𝑓. In equilibrium, the supervisor will fire first the non-intrinsically motivated workers 
(𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅) before firing at random (𝑛�𝑓 − (𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅))  low-ability intrinsically 
motivated workers. 
○ Case C. We consider 𝑛� 𝑓 < 𝑛 − 𝑛𝐿,𝑅 − 𝑛𝐻,𝑅. 
This case is similar to Case B. The same types of equilibria (i to v) exist and derivations are 
obtained following the same procedure. 
 
We summarize equilibrium decisions for each equilibrium type in Table O.1. 
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TABLE O.1 Summary of workers’ equilibrium decisions in the probationary period (t=1) under different types of 
equilibrium in which the supervisor monitors workers. 
Equilibrium Type Workers’ levels of productive (𝑒𝑃) and nonproductive (𝑒~𝑃) effort. 
i) � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹
~𝑃∗(1) = �1 − 𝛼𝐿
𝛼𝐻
� (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
ii) � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
iii) � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛼𝐿𝛼𝐻 (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹
~𝑃∗(1) = �1 − 𝛼𝐿
𝛼𝐻
� (𝛾 − 𝛽) 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
iv) � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(1) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(1) = 0 � 
v) � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0
𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹𝑃∗(𝑡) = 𝛾 − 𝛽 � 𝑒ℎ~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙~𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0𝑒ℎ𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 𝑒𝑙𝑅,𝐹~𝑃∗(𝑡) = 0 � 
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In Table O.2, we establish the conditions under which the treatment with firing threats (F) 
leads to higher production levels than the individual incentives treatment (I) in the probation 
period, for any 𝑗𝜖{𝐿,𝐻}.  
 
TABLE O.2  
COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION LEVELS AND INTERNET USAGE 
BETWEEN TREATMENT I AND TREATMENT F 
Equilibrium 
type 
Treatment F leads to higher production levels than 
Treatment I under the following conditions 
Treatment F leads to  
lower Internet usage 
than Treatment I 
i) 𝛾 ≥
𝑛𝐿𝛼
2
𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼2𝐻 − 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝛽(𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿)
�𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅�𝛼𝐿  𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼𝐻𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 
ii) 𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼
2
𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼2𝐻
𝑛𝐿,~𝑅𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝛼𝐻 𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼𝐻𝑛𝐿,~𝑅 + 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅 
iii) 𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼
2
𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼2𝐻 − 𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝛽(𝛼𝐻 − 𝛼𝐿) − 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅𝛽𝛼𝐿
𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝛼𝐿  𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼𝐻 − 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅(𝜑− 𝛽)𝑛𝐻,~𝑅  
iv) 𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼
2
𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼2𝐻 − 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅𝛽𝛼𝐿
𝑛𝐻,~𝑅𝛼𝐻  𝛾 ≥ 𝑛𝐿𝛼𝐿 + 𝑛𝐻𝛼𝐻 − 𝑛𝐿,~𝑅(𝜑− 𝛽)𝑛𝐻,~𝑅  
v) Never Never 
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ONLINE.2. INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND ARITHMETIC SKILLS (SURVEY)  
In the following regression, we use data from an independent sample of subjects who were 
invited to participate in a one-hour survey in which subjects had to answer questions related to 
demographics, personality traits and arithmetic skills.37 In particular, subjects’ summation skills 
were measured in an incentivized exercise similar to the work task in the current experimental 
design in the spirit of Dohmen and Falk (2011). Subjects were asked to sum five one-digit 
numbers for a duration of five minutes. The number of correct answers is what we refer to as 
Ability in Table O.3 below. In addition, subjects answered the following question: “How much 
do you like mathematics?” on a 7-point Likert scale as an attempt to measure intrinsic motivation 
in the summation task. We define the variable Intrinsic Motivation as the answer (between 1 and 
7) to the previous question. Note that subjects (in experimental sessions with a chat room) 
typically refer to the Task as “math”. We also collected a measure of unincentivized productivity 
à la Dohmen and Falk (2011) in which subjects were asked to sum five numbers as fast as 
possible without being paid for it. Note that we obtain similar results using this variable as a 
measure of intrinsic motivation. 
Given that all 296 subjects recruited for the survey participated in earlier experiments similar 
to the one described in the current paper, we were able to regress their individual production on 
the work task as well as their use of Internet in the previous experiment with respect to Ability 
and Intrinsic Motivation. 
TABLE O.3 Tobit regression with random effects for individual production and 
internet usage with respect to intrinsic motivation and ability. 
 Individual Production Internet usage 
Intercept -2.570 1.039** 
Ability 23.349*** -0.018 
Intrinsic Motivation 28.486** -0.138** 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 296 
(28 left censored) 
L = -2038.521 
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 296 
(67 left censored) 
L = -194.554 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.042 
 
 
                                            
37 Due to the double-blind protocol used in the lab where the experiments for the current paper were conducted, we 
could not invite back these subjects to participate in the survey. 
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Using the same survey data as in Table O.3, we conducted a regression to estimate the effect of 
individual production, intrinsic motivation and ability on the probability of a subject’s success in 
completing the first table (see Table O.4). We find that Ability coefficient is positive and highly 
significant, while the coefficient for Intrinsic Motivation is not significant. This result suggests 
that the variable First Table Correct can be used as a proxy for subjects’ ability. 
TABLE O.4 Probit regression with random effects for our measure of ability 
(success in completing the first table) with respect to production and intrinsic 
motivation. 
 First Table Correct First Table Correct 
Intercept -0.777*** -0.443* 
Individual Production 0.051*** - 
Intrinsic Motivation -0.015 0.016 
Ability - 0.021*** 
Number of observations 
and 
Log likelihood (L) 
n = 296 
L = -160.052 
[Prob > χ²] < 0.001 
n = 296 
L = -181.040 
[Prob > χ²] = 0.028 
 
ONLINE.3. THE CLICKING TASK 
In each period, subjects could earn up to $2.40 by clicking on the box that appeared on their 
screen every 25 seconds. We summarize the earnings on the clicking task in Table O.5 by 
displaying the proportion of times a subject clicked on a box before it disappeared from the 
screen. We refer to this proportion as the success rate. 
TABLE O.5. Clicking task performance across treatments. 
Clicking task Treatment W Treatment F Treatment I 
Success rate 94% 96% 95% 
Pairwise comparison of treatments (Proportion tests (p-values)) 
Treatment F 0.295 - - 
Treatment I 0.692 0.655 - 
Success rate: Average proportion of the 240 boxes subjects clicked. 
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We observe that subjects were able to click on almost all the boxes regardless of the treatment 
and the activity they were undertaking (work task, Internet, chatting or monitoring others) and 
whether they had being fired (in which case the value of each box was only 1cent). The average 
earnings on the clicking task were equal to $2.26, $2.30 and 2.28$ for Treatments W, F and I, 
respectively.  
ONLINE.4. CHAT ANALYSIS 
TABLE O.6 Categories for chat messages. 
New Category Category Number Category 
Distraction 
1 Greetings (Hello/Goodbye) 
2 Distracting others (jokes, stories) 
3 Personal chat (talking about likes and dislikes) 
4 Others (not readable) 
5 Complaints about Task 
Encouragements 
6 Encouraging others to produce 
7 Thanking other for their cooperative behavior 
8 C give positive feedback about B contributions 
9 Help others complete the task 
Discouragements 
10 Discouraging others to produce 
11 Asking others what is the point of producing 
anything 
12 C give negative feedback about B contributions 
Performance evaluation and 
comparison 
13 Ask others' performance on the task 
14 B asks C about his/her own relative performance on 
the task 
15 State your own performance 
Threats 
16 B threatening C not to produce anything 
17 C Threatening others to fire them if they do not 
produce enough 
Complaints about 
firing/supervision strategy 
18 Complaints about the supervision of the C subject 
19 Complaints about the firing strategy of the C subject 
Comments on 
firing/supervision strategy 
20 Suggesting/stating Firing strategy 
21 Suggesting/stating Supervising strategy 
22 Comments on effectiveness of firing policy 
Envy 23 B envying the C subject 
Non-strategic 
comments on the experiment 
24 Ask others for help and hints to complete the task 
25 General comments about the experiment and its 
goals 
26 Specific comments on how earnings are calculated 
27 Other specific comments on the experiment 
Influence and manipulation 28 Influencing C subject 
Fairness 29 Comments on fairness of firing policy 
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FIGURE O.1.— Histogram of categorization of messages for all treatments38 
 
 
                                            
38 We computed frequencies by taking the average frequency of a given category across the two independent raters. 
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TABLE O.7 Inter-rater analysis of chat messages categorization. 
Category Agreement Expected Agreement Kappa 
Standard 
Error Z 
Prob>
Z 
1 99% 95% 0.85 0.023 37.38 0 
2 78% 55% 0.51 0.021 24.11 0 
3 94% 93% 0.06 0.023 2.65 0.004 
4 94% 92% 0.27 0.02 13.63 0 
5 99% 98% 0.43 0.022 19.84 0 
6 98% 97% 0.36 0.021 16.76 0 
7 99% 99% 0.25 0.02 12.56 0 
8 99% 99% 0.38 0.019 20 0 
9 94% 89% 0.44 0.02 21.75 0 
10 96% 93% 0.38 0.02 18.8 0 
11 99% 99% 0.4 0.022 17.83 0 
12 100% 99% 0.5 0.022 22.28 0 
13 99% 98% 0.52 0.023 22.83 0 
14 100% 99% 0.72 0.023 31.67 0 
15 95% 88% 0.55 0.023 24.39 0 
16 99% 99% 0.4 0.021 19.12 0 
17 99% 99% 0.43 0.021 20.7 0 
18 97% 95% 0.48 0.022 21.93 0 
19 100% 100% 0.25 0.02 12.67 0 
20 99% 99% 0 0 0 0.5 
21 97% 97% 0.02 0.016 1.33 0.0922 
22 100% 100% 0 0 0 0.5 
23 99% 97% 0.46 0.021 21.78 0 
24 94% 92% 0.22 0.016 13.72 0 
25 78% 77% 0.08 0.013 5.92 0 
26 91% 89% 0.18 0.018 9.64 0 
27 89% 89% 0.01 0.007 -0.77 0.7791 
28 99% 98% 0.31 0.021 14.64 0 
29 100% 100% 0 0 0 0.5 
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